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1 Introduction
Today, consumers purchasing goods can choose between two retail channels: physical
stores (or brick-and-mortar stores) and online stores (or e-tailers). These two alternative
channels have their distinct advantages and disadvantages. If a consumer purchases an unfa-
miliar good such as clothes, shoes, and food online, she is likely to receive a mismatched good
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in terms of size, color, or taste because of the paucity or lack of information about the good
in the online catalog. On the other hand, consumers who purchase goods from a physical
store incur the transportation costs of visiting the store; in addition, they must forgo the ad-
vantages of cost savings associated with online shopping because major online stores gener-
ally do not pass on shipping charges to the consumers.
While purchasing goods from online stores, consumers face disutility due to the lack of
match, as Balasubramanian (1998) notes. For example, some consumers might reconcile
themselves to the curtain that was delivered but a little mismatched to their room in terms
of color. They cannot return the good to the seller under the conditions of the contract; even
if they could return the purchased good, they would have to waste time in searching for an-
other suitable good. However, if consumers visit physical stores to obtain information about
the good, this disutility disappears. They can confirm the color of the curtain, for example,
and immediately obtain the most suitable pattern of the good.
In the case of online stores, however, besides benefiting from the absence of transportation
costs, consumers need not incur any shipping costs (with some conditions) if they use some
major e-commerce retailers. For example, Amazon.com offers free shipping for some of the
products they sell. According to the sites terms and conditions:1
You receive free shipping if your order includes at least $35 of qualifying merchandise,
excluding gift-wrap and taxes. Eligible items will display Free Shipping next to their
price. Items must be sold or fulfilled by Amazon to qualify toward reaching the $35
minimum purchase for free shipping by Amazon. Certain oversize and heavy items
arent eligible.
While online stores are able to offer free shipping for several reasons, one important reason
would be the well-developed delivery networks they have built, which traditional stores can-
not replicate. For example, online stores with large lot orders are generally important trans-
action counterparts of delivery and logistic companies, who discount the shipping charges
for delivering the goods ordered in these online stores. Thus, online shoppers can benefit
from lower costs.
Facing the dilemma of choosing between physical stores and online stores, some consum-
ers might display another behavior for minimizing costs and disutility. They go to a physical
store to obtain relevant product information for reducing mismatch; subsequently, they pur-
chase the product from an online store to avoid the shipping charges. Thus, an online store
selling the same product as a physical store does can take advantage of the product informa-
tion shared with the consumer by the physical store. Such free-riding behavior of consumers
is referred to as showrooming in recent literature (Bosman 2011; Zimmerman 2012).
This article analyzes showrooming and its effect on the competition between physical
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1 About Free Shipping by Amazon," http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/?n
odeId=201117690 (accessed on 2 August 2014).
stores and online stores. We formulate a spatial market model in which the consumer can
purchase a particular good from either a physical store or an online store, and we show that
one of two types of equilibrium might exist in the price competition. In the model, we empha-
size the role of shipping costs that are assumed to be incurred by consumers only when they
purchase goods from physical stores, which would determine the equilibrium that arises.
The research on online markets versus physical markets has increased significantly in re-
cent years. We owe the basic framework of this article to Balasubramanian (1998). In his
model, some physical stores are symmetrically located on a circular market similar to
Salops (1979) model, and one direct retailer such as a catalog merchant exists. Consumers
who are distributed on the circular market must travel to the nearest physical store and bear
the associated transportation costs; the direct retailer would then ship the product to the
consumer for a fee. There is some disutility for the consumers in this market. In price equi-
librium, a wedge form of market arises, where consumers are segregated in their locations.
A drawback of Balasubramanians (1998) study is the assumption of homogeneous disutility
for consumers. Yoo and Lee (2011) provide another model with heterogeneous disutility for
analyzing the two alternative channels. They find that the introduction of e-commerce does
not necessarily have an impact on the competition. Our research draws on Yoo and Lees
(2011) heterogeneous disutility; we examine a model with two types of disutility in this ar-
ticle. Digital format sales such as e-books affect the form of selling and contracts between
manufacturers and retailers. Abhishek, Jerath, and Zhang (2015) highlight the externality
between physical markets and online markets to determine the optimal formats of digital
goods. Our findings suggest an implicit collusion between physical stores and online stores,
which accounts for the effect across the two markets.
In the context of multi-channel distribution, Shin (2007) studies a free-riding problem
where consumers who obtain information about goods from one retail channel may eventu-
ally purchase the goods from another channel. Given symmetric costs to use the two chan-
nels, he suggests that such free-riding may increase the profits of both the retailers.
However, Mehra, Kumar, and Raju (2014) introduce heterogeneous costs across the two re-
tail channels and conclude that showrooming would induce an intensification of price compe-
tition because the price-cutting incentive of the physical stores due to showrooming
dominates the price increase incentive of the online stores due to the acquisition of
showrooming consumers. Eventually, the profits of physical stores decrease with
showrooming. Liu (2013) extends such free-riding models to investigate the price-matching
strategy in a vertical differentiation model. This study introduces consumer heterogeneity in
hassle costs and suggests that a price-matching guarantee can increase the profits when
the level of quality free-riding is sufficiently high.
To the best of our knowledge, Balakrishnan, Sundaresan, and Zhang (2014) present a
model that is most similar to ours. Similar to our model, their model assumes heterogeneous
consumers in terms of the relative costs to use the two retail channels (i.e., physical stores
and online stores), and they identify three types of consumer behaviors. Their main finding
is that showrooming reduces the profits of both physical stores as well as online stores by
the intensification of price competitions. This finding may appear to be quite similar to ours
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at a glance. However, there are several decisive differences between these two models. First,
Balakrishnan et al. (2014) incorporate heterogeneous costs associated with purchasing from
online stores while we use a Hotelling-Salop model where consumers must incur transporta-
tion costs for visiting the nearest physical store. Second, in their model, whether a consumer
likes the good is determined ex ante with some degree of probability; consumers do not pur-
chase the good from any store if they find that it is not to their taste. On the other hand, we
implicitly assume that physical stores offer goods of all sizes, colors, or tastes such that
every consumer can find a good that satisfies her requirement. That is, a mismatch in size,
color, or taste would appear only when purchasing online without showrooming. Third, in
order to focus on the relative costs of purchasing from retail channels, we do not consider the
option of returning the product, which is incorporated in the prior model. Instead, we com-
bine dissatisfaction, lack of physical fitness, cognitive costs, and even return fees into a fixed
parameter of the disutility arising from using online stores. That is, we show that
showrooming can occur even without returns. Finally, Balakrishnan et al.s (2014) model de-
rives three types of equilibrium while our model shows only two. Despite such differences in
settings, the two models agree that in equilibrium with showrooming, both physical stores
as well as online stores charge lower prices and obtain lower profits than they do in equilib-
rium without showrooming.
The findings of this article can be summarized as follows. First, we show that there are
two types of price equilibrium in the competition between a physical store and an online
store. In the first equilibrium, some consumers opt for showrooming, given low prices at
both the stores; consumers do not do so in the second equilibrium. Showrooming allows the
online store to attract consumers away from the physical store. Second, the physical store
and the online store have incentives to deter the first type of equilibrium because the online
store must lower the price sufficiently to induce showrooming, which effectively negates the
increase in demand. Such incentives suggest an implicit collusion between these stores; the
authorities must watch out for and prevent such collusion. Finally, in the case of heterogene-
ous disutility, the stores face severe price competition, and the first type of equilibrium is
less likely to arise when the proportion of consumers with large disutility is large.
In the next section, we formulate the basic model for showrooming and derive the price
equilibrium. A discussion of the results follows in Section 3. We examine some comparative
statistics and compare these with the results of the case without showrooming. For an exten-
sion of the model, we analyze the model with heterogeneous disutility of consumers in
Section 4. We conclude the paper with suggestions for further research in Sectiou 5.
2 The Basic Model
2.1 Showrooming and Three Types of Consumer Utility
Following Balasubramanian (1998), we set up a circular spatial market for a good as the
basic model. On the circumference L of the market, consumers are uniformly distributed at
density one and N physical stores are located symmetrically (Figure 1). Although each store
is owned by distinct firms, throughout this article, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium,
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which assumes an identical price for a particular good at any store. Therefore, we can choose
any store, named S, at point 0 on the circumference. Further, we assume there is a unique on-
line store, named N, located at the center. A consumer must purchase one unit of the good
by assuming that the reservation utility from the good (v) is sufficiently large.2 If a con-
sumer purchases the good from S, she has to pay the transportation cost (t per unit of dis-
tance) and the shipping cost (d per unit of distance). In this article, we formulate consumer
utility in linear form. Thus, if a consumer located at point s purchases the good from store
S, which charges price pS, the utility for the consumer would be:
uS＝v－(t＋d)s－pS (1)
Note that while purchasing a good from a physical store, the consumer can take a look at the
actual good at the store and obtain complete information about it. We categorize consumers
purchasing from store S as Type S, by abuse of notation.
On the other hand, a consumer could visit store S to look at the actual good. However, she
does not purchase the good on the spot; instead, she returns home and orders it from the on-
line store, N. This showrooming enables the consumer to obtain complete information about
the good and purchase it at the online price. An important assumption in our model for the
online store is the advantage in terms of shipping cost. Here, we assume d＝0 for store N for
reasons of simplicity. That is, consumers do not need to pay any shipping cost while purchas-
ing goods from online store N. Hence, if a consumer located at point s visits store S for
showrooming and purchases from online store N who charges price pS, the utility for the
consumer would be:
uA＝v－ts－pN (2)
Consumers displaying such showrooming are categorized as Type A.
In the third case, a consumer can purchase the good from the online store N directly. In
this case, the consumer does not pay either transportation cost or shipping cost. However,
Yasuyuki KUSUDA
71
2 Later in this article, we introduce heterogeneous consumers who do not purchase any good.
Figure 1. Circular Market (N＝4)
the consumer does not get to see the actual good until it is delivered to her home.
Consequently, there is always a chance that the delivered good may not fit in size or that it
does not match the consumers expectations about color or other preferences. Let μ＞0 de-
note the disutility from mismatch as a fixed monetary value in the case where the consumer
directly purchases from N. Although μ would vary for each consumer, we consider it to be
identical, assuming that the consumer preference for risk is homogeneous. Hence, if a con-
sumer located at point s purchases directly from store N, the utility for that consumer would
be:
uB＝v－μ－pN (3)
Such direct online buyers are categorized as Type B.
Figure 1 shows the market shares for store S and store N. Assuming symmetry of loca-
tions and prices across the stores, store S would face L/2N length interval for the market to
the right. Since a consumer located near S would probably purchase the good from the store
and other consumers would purchase it from N, the interval is divided into two regions that
determine each markets share. Although the utility curves uS and uA are downward sloping
with distinct slopes, uB is shaped as a horizontal line.3 These positions determine the market
shares for store S and store N because each consumers behavior is intended to maximize the
utility across uS, uA, and uB.
2.2 Price Equilibrium
We now derive price equilibrium in the competition between store S and store N in the con-
text of the showrooming of consumers. First, we restrict the range of possible disutility.
Assumption 1. 0＜
μ
t ＜
L
2N .
This assumption presumes that the intersection of the utility curves uA and uB (μ/t ) is lo-
cated in an open interval (0, L/2N). In other words, without store S, Type A and Type B con-
sumers must have market shares. Thus, we have to examine four cases for price pS to pN
(Table 1).
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Table 1. Four Regions and Three Types of Consumers
Region I: pN－
d
t μ＜pS＜pN (Type S, A, and B)
Region II: pN＋μ－
(t＋d)L
2N ＜pS＜pN－
d
t μ (Type S and B)
Region III: pS＜pN＋μ－
(t＋d)L
2N (Type S)
Region IV: pN＜pS (Type A and B)
3 On the contrary, in Balakrishnan et al.'s (2014) model, downward utility lines appear for show-
rooming and direct online consumers, while a horizontal line appears for physical consumers.
The type of consumer is determined according to these regions. For example, in Region I, all
types of consumers (Types S, A, and B) can exist, while only Type S and Type B can exist
in Region II. Figure 2 shows the positions of the utility curves uS, uA, and uB for each region.
At the pair of prices, pS and pN, store S obtains sA, sB, L/2N, and 0 as the demand in Region
I, II, III, and IV, respectively. The profit of store S can be summarized as:
Store S is expected to maximize πS given pN in the standard Bertrand game manner. For rea-
sons of simplicity, we ignore all costs (production cost, wholesale price, etc.) for the stores
throughout this article.
Next, we compare these profits with one another. The profits in Region I, II, and III are de-
noted by πAS , π
B
S, and π
C
S, respectively:
πAS＝
1
d (pN－pS)pS
πBS＝
1
t＋d (pN－pS＋μ)pS (5)
πCS＝
L
2N pS
The four prices are defined as follows:
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πS＝

















L
2N pS
1
t＋d(pN－pS＋μ)pS
1
d (pN－pS)pS
0
if
if
if
if
pS＜pN＋μ－
(t＋d)L
2N ,
pN＋μ－
(t＋d)L
2N ＜pS＜pN－
d
t μ,
pN－
d
t μ＜pS＜pN ,
pN＜pS
(4)
Figure 2. Utility Patterns
pA＝
1
2 pN (maximizes π
A
S )
pB＝
1
2 (pN＋μ) (maximizes π
B
S)
(6)
pC＝pN－
d
t μ (such that π
A
S＝π
B
S)
pD＝pN＋μ－
(t＋d)L
2N (such that π
B
S＝π
C
S)
These prices are alternatives of the optimal price strategy for store S; thus, they could com-
pose the reaction curve for the store. Note that Regions I-IV can be denoted using these sym-
bols. We can easily show that pA＜pB and pD＜pC＜pN for any pN. Thus, there can be four
cases, as shown in Figure 3 (the proof is omitted).
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Figure 3. Pattern of Profit for Store S
Case 1: pB＜pD＜pC. The maximum is πD.
Case 2: pD＜pB＜pC. The maximum is πB.
Case 3: pA＜pC＜pB. The maximum is πC.
Case 4: pC＜pA＜pB. The maximum is πA.
whereπA＝max π
A
S ,πB＝max π
B
S,πC is πS such that π
A
S＝π
B
S, andπD is πS such that π
B
S＝
πCS. Consequently, the reaction curve for store S is:
The reaction curve is shown in Figure 4(1). Lines A-D determine the shape of the curve.
Figure 4(1) shows that the curve is located under the 45-degree line, except at the origin.
Thus, we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 1. No price equilibrium exists in the region where pS＞pN.
The implication of this proposition is trivial. Store S has a disadvantage in the form of ship-
ping costs, which causes the steeper utility curve compared to that of store N [see Figure
4(1)]. If store S sets the price of the good higher than that in store N, even a consumer lo-
cated at point 0 would prefer to purchase the good from store N rather than from store S.
In other words, store N has no incentive to set higher prices than the prices set by store S in
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PS (pN)＝

















1
2 pN
pN－
d
t μ
1
2 (pN＋μ)
pN＋μ－
(t＋d)L
2N
if
if
if
if
0＜pN＜
2d
t μ,
2d
t μ＜pN＜
2d＋t
t μ,
2d＋t
t μ＜pN＜
2(t＋d)L
2N －μ,
2(t＋d)L
2N －μ＜pN
(7)
Figure 4. Reaction Curves
equilibrium. Therefore, we can restrict the possibility to the region where pN＞pS hencefor-
ward, and eliminate Region IV from subsequent analyses.
Assumption 2. Store N sets price pN＞pS.
Given this assumption, we examine store N. The profit of store N can be denoted as:
We define π′A, π′B, p′A, and p′B as follows:
π′A＝
1
d [
dL
2N －pN＋pS]pN
(9)
π′B＝
1
t＋d [
(t＋d)L
2N －pN＋pS－μ]pN
p′A＝
1
2 (pS＋
dL
2N) (maximizes πA)
(10)
p′B＝
1
2 [ pS－μ＋
(t＋d)L
2N ] (maximizes πB)
We find that only three cases exist:
Case 1: p′A＜p′B＜p′C. The maximum is π′B.
Case 2: p′A＜p′C＜p′B. The maximum is max {π′A, π′B}.
Case 3: p′C＜p′A＜p′B. The maximum is π′A.
where the definitions of π′A and π′B are similar to those in the case of store S. We define the
following value as:
p＊S＝φ( tL2N －μ)－
dL
2N , φ≡
√d
√t＋d －√d (11)
This value is pS, where π′A＝π′B.
The reaction curve for store N under Assumption 2 can be denoted as:
Figure 4(2) shows the reaction curve for store N when
dL
2N －
2d
t μ＜ p
＊
S＜
(t＋d)L
2N －
2d＋t
t μ.
The reaction curve is composed of line A′and line B′that are parallel to each other. Thus, un-
like the reaction curve for store S, store Ns reaction curve has a discontinuous region [the
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πN＝













[ L2N －
1
d (pN－pS)]pN
[ L2N －
1
t＋d (pN－pS＋μ)]pN
0
if
if
if
pS＜pN＜pS＋
d
t μ,
pS＋
d
t μ＜pN＜pS－μ＋
(t＋d)L
2N ,
pS－μ＋
(t＋d)L
2N ＜pN
(8)
PN (pS)＝







1
2 [pS－μ＋
(t＋d)L
2N ]
1
2 (pS＋
dL
2N )
if
if
0＜pS＜max{ dL2N －
2d
t μ, p
＊
S },
min{ (t＋d)L2N －
2d＋t
t μ, p
＊
S }＜pS
(12)
dotted line in Figure 4(2)].
We now have the proposition for price equilibrium.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium of the price competition between store S and store N is as
follows:
Proof. First, we show that line C in Figure 4(1) and line A′in Figure 4(2) cannot intersect
when pS＜ p＊S＝φ( tL2N －μ)－
dL
2N . Since the price of store S in the intersection between line
C and line A′is pS＝
dL
2N －
2dμ
t , we have pS－ p
＊
S＝(tφ－2d)( L2N －
μ
t ). Here, (
L
2N －
μ
t )＞0
from Assumption 1, and (tφ－2d)＞0 when t＞0. Hence, pS＞ p＊S, which implies that line C
and line A′cannot intersect when pS＜ p＊S . Similarly, line C and line B′in Figure 4(2) cannot
intersect when pS＜ p＊S . Therefore, from these two facts and the conditions for store Ns reac-
tion curve, we find that there is no equilibrium on line C. It is obvious that line A and line
B′cannot intersect in the same region; the case of line B and line A′is similar.4 Thus, if an
equilibrium exists, it must be at either the intersection between line A and line A′[repre-
sented as (p＊IS, p
＊I
N) hereafter] in Region I or the intersection between line B and line B′[rep-
resented as (p＊IIS , p
＊II
N ) hereafter] in Region II. Given the conditions for the reaction curve of
store N, we need p＊IS ＞ p
＊
S for the former case and p
＊II
S ＜ p
＊
S for the latter. The former case cor-
responds to (1) and the latter corresponds to (2); then, (3) can be shown (Q.E.D.).
3 Discussion
3.1 Comparative Statistics
In this section, we discuss price equilibrium to determine the implications of the show-
rooming of consumers in the competition between store S and store N.
Figure 5 shows the three cases for price equilibrium. In Figure 5(1), line A and line A′in-
tersect at point (p＊IS, p
＊I
N) in Region I. As discussed earlier, there can be different types (S, A,
and B) of consumers in this region. Thus, the consumers located near store S purchase the
good from store S; the consumers located far from store S access store N directly; and the
consumers located midway visit store S to obtain information about the good before pur-
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(1) if
μ
t ＞
L
2N , equilibrium prices are p
＊
S＝
1
3
dL
2N and p
＊
N＝
2
3
dL
2N ;
(2) if
μ
t ＜
L
2N , equilibrium prices are p
＊
S＝
1
3 [
(t＋d)L
2N ＋μ] and p＊N＝
2
3 [
(t＋d)L
2N －
μ
2 ];
(3) otherwise, there is no equilibrium.
φ－
4d
3t
φ( )
φ＋
1
3
φ－
1
3
－
4d
3t( )
4 We can also show that neither line A′nor line B′in Figure 4(2) can intersect line D in Figure 4(1).
chasing from store N. Another equilibrium is present at the intersection (p＊IIS , p
＊II
N ) between
line B and line B′in Region II, as shown in Figure 5(2). In this case, Type A consumers do
not exist; consumers purchase the good from store S or directly from store N without
showrooming. Figure 5(3) presents the third case where no equilibrium exists. In this case,
line A and line A′do not intersect and neither do line B and line B′. Henceforth, we call
(p＊IS, p
＊I
N) Equilibrium I and (p
＊II
S , p
＊II
N ) Equilibrium II. These two equilibria can be characterized
by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For each store, the equilibrium price in Equilibrium I is lower than that in
Equilibrium II; p＊IS＜p
＊II
S and p
＊I
N＜p
＊II
N .
Proof. p＊IIS －p
＊I
S ＝
1
3 (
tL
2N ＋μ)＞0 and p＊IIN－p＊IN ＝
1
3 (
2tL
2N －μ)＞0 from Assumption 1 (Q.E.D.).
The implication of Proposition 3 is easy to understand. If μ is sufficiently large toward d,
consumers might be attracted to purchase from store S rather than from store N because the
disutility caused by lack of information is large, but the advantage of shopping online is
small. Consumers would prefer to resort to showrooming to mediate the disadvantages of
these two alternatives. In this case, store N must attract the consumers with showrooming
tendencies by offering a sufficiently low price; if not, this store would lose out on these con-
sumers. In turn, the low price of store N must cause store S to lower the price due to strate-
gic complements, which leads to low prices in Equilibrium I. On the other hand if μ is not
large, the consumers tend to purchase from store N without showrooming because they are
less worried about disutility due to lack of information. Therefore, store N would not need
to lower the price, which causes high prices in Equilibrium II.
The equilibrium that would arise (or not) depends on the parameters t, d, μ, and L/2N.
We define two borders as follows:
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Figure 5. Price Equilibrium
Figure 6 demonstrates α and β on space (μt , d). Given d, Equilibrium I arises when α＜μ
t , no equilibrium arises when β＜
μ
t ＜α, and Equilibrium II arises when
μ
t ＜β. We can
prove that α＞β for any t,d＞0. The region for Equilibrium II must appear on the left side
and that for Equilibrium I on the right side in Figure 6. We can also prove that 0＜α＜
L
2N and
∂α
∂d ＜0 . Thus, when d is larger, the region for Equilibrium I might be broader. In
other words, if the shipping cost of store S is high and store N becomes more attractive to
consumers in terms of cost, more consumers would resort to showrooming in this equilib-
rium. Interestingly, the region for Equilibrium II also seems to be broader for a larger d in
Figure 6. Subsequently, the non-equilibrium region becomes narrower if d increases. We can
explain this result as follows. A large difference in the shipping costs of the stores implies a
large differentiation to the consumers. If the differentiation is large and the disutility in-
volved in shopping online is large, store N would prefer to mediate its disadvantage by let-
ting consumers resort to showrooming. However, if the disutility is small but the two stores
are differentiated among the consumers, store N might not need to use the showrooming
strategy because it must sacrifice its high profits by lowering the price. Eventually, there is
a clear difference in the optimal strategy taken by store N according to the degree of d.
3.2 Non-showrooming
In this section, we discuss how showrooming affects the price strategies of the stores by
comparing the earlier results to the results without showrooming. If consumers do not hit
upon the idea of showrooming in store S, they must compare uS in Equation (1) and uB in
Equation (2) to determine the store from which to purchase the good. We can derive the
profits for store S and N as follows:
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α≡
L
2N , β≡
L
2N
φ－
4 d
3 t
φ( ) φ＋ 1
3
φ－
1
3
－
4 d
3 t( )
Figure 6. Equilibrium Regions
Accordingly, their reaction curves are:
Thus, we can derive the price equilibrium, summarized as Proposition 4 (the proof is omit-
ted).
Proposition 4. Without showrooming of consumers, a unique equilibrium of the price com-
petition between store S and store N exists: p＊＊S ＝
1
3 [
(t＋d)L
2N ＋μ] and p＊＊N ＝
2
3 [
(t＋d)L
2N －
μ
2 ].
The outcome in this equilibrium is equivalent to Equilibrium II (p＊IIS , p
＊II
N ) in the price compe-
tition with showrooming. Thus, p＊IS ＜p
＊＊
S and p
＊I
N ＜p
＊＊
N . Even if consumers have a chance for
showrooming, they would not opt for it in Region II, where store S is sufficiently attractive.
With no incentive for store N to induce the consumers to opt for showrooming, the equilib-
rium prices remain high. Thus, showrooming does not matter in Region II. Therefore, we
focus on showrooming in Region I.
Suppose α＜
μ
t , where Equilibrium I arises if consumers have the chance for showrooming.
In this case, store N might reduce the price in the optimal strategy; then, store Ss price
would also need to be decreased for the consumers who preview the information about the
good in store S. Thus, π＊IS ＜π
＊＊
S . Therefore, store S has an incentive to deter consumers from
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πS＝













L
2N pS
1
t＋d(pN－pS＋μ)pS
0
if
if
if
pS＜pN＋μ－
(t＋d)L
2N ,
pN＋μ－
(t＋d)L
2N ＜pS＜pN＋μ,
pN＋μ＜pS
(13)
πN＝













L
2N pN
[ L2N－
1
t＋d(pN－pS＋μ)]pN
0
if
if
if
pN＜pS－μ,
pS－μ＜pN＜pS－μ＋
(t＋d)L
2N ,
pS－μ＋
(t＋d)L
2N ＜pN
(14)
pS＝









1
2 (pN＋μ)
pN＋μ－
(t＋d)L
2N
if
if
pN＜
2(t＋d)L
2N －μ,
2(t＋d)L
2N －μ＜pN
(15)
pN＝









1
2 [pS－μ＋
(t＋d)L
2N ]
pS－μ
if
if
pS＜μ＋
(t＋d)L
2N ,
μ＋
(t＋d)L
2N ＜pS
(16)
showrooming in its store. More interestingly, we find the following fact.5
Proposition 5. Store Ns profit in Equilibrium I is smaller than its profit in the equilibrium
without showrooming: π＊IS ＜π

N .
Proof. We can derive:
Sign{πN－π
＊I
S }＝Sign{( 2(√d(t＋d)－d√t＋dt√d )
L
2N －
μ
t }
where the figure in parentheses on the right side is larger than the unity for any t,d＞0.
From Assumption 1, the figure in curly braces on the right side is positive (Q.E.D.).
This finding is not obvious and requires some discussion. First, we have p＊IN ＜p
＊＊
N but s
＊I
N＞
sN, where s
＊I
N≡
L
2N －
1
d (p
＊I
N－p
＊I
S ) and s

N ≡
L
2N －
1
t＋d(p
＊＊
N－p
＊＊
S ＋μ). Thus, if the consumers
opt for showrooming in Region I, store N can attract more consumers away from store S,
but the price must be lowered. Since π＊IN ＝p
＊I
N＜p
＊I
N・s
＊I
N and π

N ＝p＊＊N・s

N , which profit is
larger depends on the degree of price elasticity of demand. In this case, the decrease of price
involves a sacrifice in the increase of consumers because price elasticity is not large.
Eventually, store N must forgo the payoff from lower price. Figure 7 shows the equilibrium
utilities in a parameter set where u0S and u
0
N represent the consumer utilities when purchas-
ing from store S and store N, respectively, in the case of non-showrooming. The results show
that the prices decrease with showrooming.
This finding involves some implications for policy makers from a consumer welfare per-
spective. Suppose store S does not want consumers to opt for showrooming in its store; fur-
ther, suppose the behavior can be prohibited with some measures. Thus, consumers cannot
obtain information about the good from store S. In this case, store N would have no incentive
to deter this strategy adopted by store S; in fact, the former would prefer this strategy so
that high prices can be maintained by both stores. However, consumer welfare would be af-
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5 This finding is derived in Balakrishnan et al. (2014) as well.
Figure 7. Comparison of Equilibrium in Preview and Non-preview Contexts
fected when prices remain high. In short, this is a kind of collusion between those stores.
From a consumer welfare perspective, policy makers would need to monitor such deterrence
of the consumers showrooming.
4 Extension: Heterogeneous Disutility
In this section, we extend the basic model to one involving heterogeneous disutility of con-
sumers. So far, the disutility caused by the lack of information about the product was as-
sumed to be identical for all the consumers involved in online shopping, and it was
represented as parameter μ. However, this is not very realistic because consumers are likely
to have various risk preferences in online shopping. In the example cited in the Introduction,
some consumers were willing to reconcile themselves to a curtain that is a little mismatched
to their room in terms of color, but others would not be satisfied with such a product. The
level of satisfaction varies across individuals, depending on their risk preference. Such varied
preferences of consumers affect their behavior with regard to online shopping.
We consider another value of disutility for consumers, assuming that consumers are het-
erogeneous in terms of their tolerance for mismatch (risk preference). For reasons of sim-
plicity, we formulate two types of disutility.
Assumption 3. There are two types of consumers based on their preferences in terms of
purchasing a good without showrooming: one type has low disutility (μ) with probability
λ, and the other type has high disutility (μ′) with probability 1－λ. Both types are distrib-
uted on the interval [0, L2N].
We can derive the equilibrium based on Assumptions 4(1) and 4(2).
Assumption 4. (1) pN－
dL
2N ＜pS＜pN ; (2)μ＜
tL
2N ＜μ′.
From Assumption 4(1), we can restrict the cases to the two possibilities presented in Table 2.
Assumption 4(2) presumes that when λ＝1, the case is the same as that discussed in Section
3. When λ＜1, for consumers with μ′to use store N, the utility from purchasing with
showrooming is higher than the utility without showrooming in the whole interval; uA＞uB
for any s∈[0, L2N]. Thus, the demands for store S and store N are exactly the same as before.
In Region II′, however, Type S and Type B exist where uB＞uS＞uA, and Type A and Type B
exist where uB＞uA＞uS for consumers with μ (see Figure 8).
Similar to the earlier case, the profits for store S and store N are as follows:
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Table 2. Regions and Types (Heterogeneous Disutility)
Region I: pN－
d
t μ＜pS＜pN (Type S, A, and B)
Region II′: pN－
dL
2N ＜pS＜pN－
d
t μ (Type S and B)
The reaction curves are as follows:
where
ψ＝
λ
t＋d/(
λ
t＋d ＋
1－λ
d ) (21)
and
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πS＝







[ λt＋d(pN－pS＋μ)＋
1－λ
d (pN－pS)] pS
1
d (pN－pS)pS
(Region I)
(Region II′)
(17)
πN＝







[ L2N－
1
d(pN－pS)]pN
[ L2N－
λ
t＋d(pN－pS＋μ)－
1－λ
d (pN－pS)] pN
(Region I)
(Region II′)
(18)
PS(pN)＝











1
2 pN
pN－
d
tμ
1
2 (pN＋μ)
if
if
if
0＜pN＜
2d
t μ,
2d
t μ＜pN＜(
2d
t ＋ψ)μ,
( 2dt ＋ψ)μ＜pN＜
2(t＋d)L
2N －(2－ψ)μ
(19)
PN(pS)＝







1
2 [pS－ψμ＋
ψ (t＋d)L
λ 2N ]
1
2 (pS＋
dL
2N )
if
if
0＜pS＜max{ dL2N －
2d
t μ, p
＊
S
λ},
min{ ψ (t＋d)Lλ 2N －(
2d
t ＋ψ)μ, p＊Sλ}＜pS
(20)
Figure 8. Utility Patterns for Heterogeneous Consumers
p＊S
λ＝
1
K {M1
L
2N －M2μ}
K≡√(t＋d)ψ－√d,
M1≡√d(t＋d)
ψ
λ－d√(t＋d)ψ, (22)
M2≡√dψ
The price equilibrium under heterogeneous disutility is stated as Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Under heterogeneous disutility, the equilibrium of the price competition be-
tween store S and store N is:
(1) if
μ
t＞αλ, equilibrium prices are p
＊
S＝
1
3
dL
2N and p
＊
N＝
2
3
dL
2N ;
(2) if
μ
t＞βλ, equilibrium prices are p
＊
S＝
1
3 [
ψ (t＋d)L
λ 2N ＋ψμ]
and p＊N＝
2
3 [
ψ (t＋d)L
λ 2N －
ψ
2μ] ;
(3) otherwise, there is no equilibrium,
where
αλ≡
K
tM2(
M1
K －
d
3 )
L
2N , βλ≡
1 [ M1K －
1
3 (t＋d)
ψ
λ]
L
2N .
t( M2K ＋
ψ
3 )
Instead of proving this proposition, we simply discuss two characteristics to demonstrate
how the outcome in this equilibrium would be different from that in the case of homogeneous
consumers.
First, Figure 9 shows the lines A, A′, B, and B′by which we represent parts of the reaction
curves for store S and store N (similar to what was done in Section 2). Note that line A and
line A′are exactly same as before, and line B(λ＝1) and line B′(λ＝1) correspond to the lines
in Section 2. When λ decreases, however, line B and line B′approach line A and line A′, re-
spectively. This causes the intersection between line B and line B′to move lower left, i.e.,
there is a low price equilibrium in Region II′. The reason why the equilibrium prices are low
in Region II′is clear. With λ＜1, store N finds out that some consumers favor store S be-
cause of significant disutility; it also finds out that some consumers want to opt for
showrooming before purchasing from store N. Such findings urge store N to lower the price
in order to overcome its disadvantage. Thus, if there is equilibrium in Region II′, the prices
must be low.
Second, the existence of consumers with λ＜1 changes the discontinuous region of store
Ns reaction curve. Thus, the borders of the equilibrium regions (αλ and βλ) vary with the
value of λ. Figure 10 demonstrates how the equilibrium regions differ for several values of
λ. Similar to Figure 6, the regions of Equilibrium I, Non-Equilibrium, and Equilibrium II′
range from right to left. Since the parameters are the same as earlier, the border curves are
exactly the same as in Figure 6 when λ＝1. If λ is lower, the region of Equilibrium II′is
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broader, but the regions of Non-Equilibrium and Equilibrium I are narrower. This is inter-
esting because lower λ implies a larger proportion of consumers with large disutility for on-
line shopping, from which we would expect more consumers to display showrooming. The
markedly lower prices in store N can explain why showrooming is abandoned. In order to at-
tract consumers away from its rivals, store N must rely on lower prices. Consequently, the
lower prices online would cause the consumers to purchase directly from store N, without
showrooming. Eventually, equilibrium is more likely in Region II′(Equilibrium II′).
From these two characteristics, we can conclude that a greater proportion of consumers
with significant disutility would deter the showrooming tendency of consumers.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we present three findings. First, there could be two types of price equilib-
rium, where some consumers display showrooming and others do not. Second, physical
stores as well as online stores have an incentive to deter the first type of equilibrium because
an online store must lower the price sufficiently for inducing showrooming. Finally, in the
case of heterogeneous disutility, the stores must face severe price competition, and the first
type of equilibrium is less likely to arise when the proportion of consumers with significant
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Figure 9. Reaction Curves and λ
Figure 10. Equilibrium Regions and λ
disutility is large. Our findings indicate an implicit collusion between physical stores and on-
line stores. From a consumer welfare perspective, policy makers would need to monitor the
deterrence of consumers showrooming because both kinds of stores would prefer to deter
consumers from showrooming to keep their prices high.
This article has two limitations. First, we do not consider how the differences in the ship-
ping costs of the physical stores and the online stores can be explained. In reality, the costs
for shipping are determined in the contract between the retail stores and the shipment com-
panies. Thus, why online stores (e.g., Amazon.com) are able to obtain favorable contracts
with shipment companies (e.g., UPS, FedEx) while the physical stores are unable to do so
needs to be examined. Including such an analysis in the current model would have made this
research too complex; future studies could consider plausible models for this analysis.
Second, we indicated the number of physical stores in the model with the symbol N but did
not examine how this value would affect the equilibrium. Instead, we fixed the length of the
segmented market (L/2N) and focused on the disutility due to transportation cost (μ/t) ac-
cording to which consumers change their behavior. However, the model can be extended to
include the dynamic aspect. For example, suppose some existing physical stores are thinking
about exiting the market, and there are some potential entrants to the market. Their choices
of entry and exit would depend on the expectation of discounted values in the long run－a
Markov type of dynamic oligopoly model. In the dynamic model, the optimal number of
physical stores on the circular market－which determines the length of the segmented mar-
ket－would need to be considered. The theoretical results can be replicated by numerical cal-
culation and simulation to predict the real figures of e-commerce in the future.
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